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i Argument Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court 
for Salt Lake County, Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, District Judge 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from an final Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, entered in favor of Defendants Sumerset Houseboats, Div. SMI ("Sumerset"), and its 
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president James E. Sharpe ("Sharpe") on September 4, 1996 after a jury trial. R. 1771-72. Appellant 
UTCO Associates ("UTCO") initially filed this appeal in the Utah Supreme Court (No. 960446), 
which had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) (1992). On March 19, 1997, the 
Utah Supreme Court poured over this appeal to this Court for disposition (No. 970190-CA). 
R. 1798. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this appeal therefore rests upon its pour-over 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k)(1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The broad issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in its legal conclusions at trial when 
it (a) dismissed UTCO's promissory estoppel claims sua sponte and when it (b) instructed to the jury 
regarding defenses not pled by defendants; (c) failed to give several of instructions to the jury 
regarding the defendants' changing of identifying serial numbers on the Houseboat, the parties' 
course of dealing, and damages for loss use of property; and (d) granted defendants' motions in limine 
which precluded UTCO from introducing evidence that the Houseboat serial numbers previously sent 
to UTCO had been changed by defendants and that a boat bearing the serial number of the Houseboat 
was subsequently sold by defendants.1 With the foregoing broad issues in mind, UTCO presents the 
following questions for review by this Court. 
1. Did the trial court err in refusing sua sponte to instruct the jury on UTCO's claim for 
promissory estoppel prior to instructing the jury, which effectively dismissed said claim. Determining 
whether the trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury instruction constitutes error presents a 
defendants filed three "combined'* Motions in Limine, one on July 11. 1997 and two more on the morning of 
July 22. 1997, Record at 1486-90. 1541-47. 1560-65. The trial court then granted the motions prior to the 
beginning of the trial. Record at 1904-10. 
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question of law, to which this Court gives no deference. Cornia v. Wilcox. 898 P.2d 1379, 1386 
(Utah 1995). ^ . X U O k - a t A V 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting defendants' motion in limine which 
precluded UTCO from introducing evidence on its fraud and negligent misrepresentaiton claims that: 
1) the serial numbers on the Houseboats had been altered by defendants; 2) the Houseboat serial 
numbers previously sent to UTCO by Sumerset and Sharpe had been changed by defendants; 3) a 
boat bearing the serial number of the Houseboat was subsequently sold by defendants.2 In reviewing 
questions of admissibility of evidence at trial, deference is given to the trial court's advantageous 
position. Heslop v. Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 828, 838 (Utah 1992) (quoting Whitehead v. American 
Motors Sales Corp.. 801 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah 1990)). Accordingly, this Court does not reverse the 
trial court's evidentiary decisions made pursuant to Rules 401 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
unless the court clearly abused its discretion. See State v. Wetzel. 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993); Nay 
v. General Motors Corp.. 850 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Utah 1993). 
3. Did the trial court err in instructing the jury regarding defendants' alleged "different 
motivations" and "inferred intent" for purposes of analyzing fraudulent intent. R. 1637, 2612-13. A 
party is entitled to a new trial where it shows that the trial court erroneously or insufficiently 
instructed the jury, or that the instruction mislead the jury and was prejudicial to the complaining 
"The Court further precluded plaintiff from presenting evidence of any complaint, conversation or investigation 
by any government agency, including the F.B.I, and precluded plaintiff from presenting the testimony of Ellen' 
Sumner and Ken Crooks, the principal investigators for the F.B.I, and the Division of Motor Vehicles regarding 
the reassignment of the serial numbers, respectively, as witnesses. Defendants filed three "combined" Motions in 
Limine, one on July 11. 1997 and two more on the morning of July 22, 1997. Record at 1486-90. 1541-47. 1560-
65. The trial court then granted the motions prior to the beginning of the trial. Record at 1904-10. 
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party. Vitale v. Belmont Springs. 916 P.2d 359, 363 (Utah Ct App. 1996). Determining whether the 
trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury instruction constitutes error presents a question of law, 
to which this Court gives no deference. Cornia v. Wilcox. 898 P.2d 1379, 1386 (Utah 1995). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
Rule 123 and Rule 41,4 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are determinative. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff appeals from the final judgment of the trial court after a jury verdict. Plaintiff filed 
this action for damages as against Sumerset Houseboats, Div. SMI's ("Sumerset") and Sharpe for 
their failure to deliver a Houseboat after receipt of $60,000. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
UTCO filed its Complaint in this case on July 21, 1993, alleging that defendants Sharpe and 
Sumerset failed to send a Houseboat as they promised after receiving the Funds from UTCO. The 
Complaint was later amended and alleges causes of action for breach of contract, negligent 
misrepresentation, fraud, promissory estoppel, quantum meruit, breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, foreclosure of security interest, conspiracy, conversion, implied contract, disregard 
of the corporate entity of Sumerset and seeking prejudgment interest and punitive damages. R. 1-11. 
Defendant Zimmerman answered the Complaint, denied liability, and affirmatively defended on the 
3
 Addendum A. 
4Addendum B 
basis that they had not made the alleged representations to plaintiff, and that he was entitled to retain 
the money sent by plaintiff in any event. R. 18-27. Defendant Zimmerman further filed a 
Counterclaim on August 25, 1993. On June 16, 1995 in response to the filing of plaintiff s Second 
Amended Complaint, R. 561-79, Defendants Sharpe and Sumerset filed an answer, and defendant 
Sumerset filed a counterclaim and third party complaint alleging that plaintiff and its attorneys had 
conspired to defraud Sumerset. R. 583-607,639-655. On February 26, 1996, the trial court entered 
its order granting Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and determined that the First 
Cause of Action of the Counterclaim, Third Party Complaint, and defendants' Eighth and Ninth 
Affirmative Defenses should be dismissed. R. 1438-43. On February 9, 1996, UTCO filed its 
Answer to the only remaining cause of action in the Counterclaim. R. 1303-06. 
The trial court, sitting without a jury, tried this action on July 22, 23, 25, 29, and 30. During 
the course of the trial, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its claims for conversion, quantum meruit, 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, foreclosure of security interest, and conspiracy 
and plaintiff presented no evidence in support of its Counterclaim. After the evidence was completed 
and just prior to instructing the jury, the Court dismissed sua sponte plaintiffs claim for promissory 
estoppel despite plaintiffs objection thereto. The jury was only instructed regarding plaintiffs claims 
for fraud, negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract. The jury returned a special verdict on 
July 30, 1996 in favor of defendants. R. 1670-72. Judgment was entered in favor of defendants on 
September 4, 1996. R.1771-73. Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on October 1, 1996. R.1774-79. 
This is an appeal from the entire judgment of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
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1. UTCO is a Utah limited partnership duly organized under the laws of the State of Utah 
and has its principal place of business located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. R.561. Robert D. 
Kent is a general partner of plaintiff. R.561. Defendant K. DeMarr Zimmerman ("Zimmerman") is 
a resident of Davis County, State of Utah, transacting business primarily in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. R.561-62,640. Zimmerman commenced a proceeding under Chapter 7 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code on October 6, 1993. R.561-62,640. Defendant Sumerset Houseboats, SMI Div. 
("Sumerset") has its principal place of business in Somerset, Kentucky. R.640 Sumerset is in the 
business of selling and shipping houseboats and has shipped houseboats to Zimmerman's place of 
business and other location specified by Zimmerman in Utah. R. 640, 2091-93. Sumerset has had 
other substantial contacts with plaintiff in the State of Utah. R. 2091-93. Defendant James E. 
Sharpe ("Sharpe") is an individual who is the president and sole shareholder of Sumerset and resides 
in or near Somerset, Kentucky. R. 640. 
On or about November 20, 1992, Zimmerman arranged to purchase from Sumerset a 1993 
Sumerset Houseboat, Serial No. SZJ02021C393, together with two motors and a generator 
(collectively referred to as the "Houseboat"), as evidenced by Sumerset's invoice No. 04009. 
R.563,641. 
Bruce J. Nelson ("Nelson"), plaintiffs former counsel, had previously arranged for houseboat 
financing for Zimmerman to purchase other houseboats from Sumerset such that plaintiff, Zimmerman 
and Sharpe had established a course of dealing regarding Zimmerman's purchase of houseboats from 
Sumerset. R.563,641. Pursuant to instructions given by Zimmerman, Sumerset and Sharpe sent the 
original Manufacturer's Statement of Origin ("MSO") to Nelson. R.563,641. 
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Sharpe and Sumerset sent the MSO to Nelson to induce plaintiff to send $58,384 (the 
"Funds") to Sharpe and Sumerset in payment of a portion of the purchase price of the Houseboat. 
R.2095. Sharpe, in a telephone conversation with Nelson, agreed to deliver the Houseboat to 
Zimmerman's place of business in Utah upon receipt of the Funds, which Sharpe alleged constituted 
the portion of the purchase price necessary for Sumerset to ship the Houseboat to Zimmerman in 
Utah. R. 2198-99. 
On or about December 22, 1992, and based upon Sharpe1 s promise to Nelson to ship the 
Houseboat to Utah upon receipt of $58,384, plaintiff agreed to loan (the "Loan") Zimmerman the 
sum of $60,000 from which Zimmerman would pay a portion of the purchase price of the Houseboat. 
R.2197-99. At the time of the Loan and to evidence the same, Zimmerman executed a Note (the 
"Note") which called for repayment of the $60,000 under the terms and conditions stated therein. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 19. At the time of the execution of the Note, Zimmerman also executed a 
Security Agreement (the "Security Agreement") in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 20. By 
the terms of the Security Agreement, Zimmerman pledged the Houseboat as collateral security for 
the Note. Id- A description of such collateral was attached to the Complaint. R.579. 
Pursuant to the terms of the agreement between plaintiff and defendants and their prior course 
of dealing, and in reliance on the promises and representations of Sharpe and Sumerset, plaintiff 
caused the Funds to be wired to Sumerset and Sharpe on or about December 29, 1992. R.2196-
99,2278-79. 
On December 29, 1992, the same day the Funds were received by Sumerset, Sharpe and 
Sumerset did not apply the Funds to the purchase of the Houseboat as represented to plaintiff, but 
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instead fraudulently applied the Funds to Zimmerman's purchase of another houseboat from Sumerset. 
R. 1005-08. Sometime between December 29, 1992 and March 9, 1993, Zimmerman, Sharpe and 
Sumerset attempted to void the sale of the Houseboat to Zimmerman. R. 565,642, 2075-76. 
Zimmerman, Sharpe and Sumerset did not give notice to plaintiff that they had attempted to void the 
sale of the Houseboat. R.2077. 
Sharpe and Sumerset thereafter reassigned the serial number for the Houseboat shown on the 
MSO sent to Nelson to a second, different houseboat manufactured by Sharpe and Sumerset. R.643. 
Sharpe and Sumerset then sold the "second" houseboat to John Runda, and issued a second MSO to 
Runda, which bears the same serial number as the first MSO sent to Nelson. R.643. 
The Houseboat never existed and there is no boat which is of the dimensions and has the 
features described in the invoice sent by defendants to plaintiff which bears Serial No. 
SZJ02021C393. R565,643. 
The trial court erroneously granted defendants' motion in limine on the first day of trial, July 
22, 1996. R. 1904-10. The Court then precluded UTCO from introducing evidence that the 
Houseboat serial numbers previously sent to UTCO had been changed by defendants and that a boat 
bearing the serial number of the Houseboat was subsequently sold by defendants.5 The Court further 
precluded plaintiff from presenting evidence of any complaint, conversation or investigation by any 
government agency, including the F.B.L and precluded plaintiff from presenting the testimony of 
Ellery Summer and Ken Crooks, the chief investigators for the F.B.L and the Division of Motor 
defendants filed three ''combined" Motions in Limine, one on July 1L 1997 and two more on the morning of 
July 22. 1997. Record at 1486-90. 1541-47. 1560-65. The trial court then granted the motions prior to the 
beginning of the trial. Record at 1904-10. 
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Vehicles, respectively, as witnesses. R. 1541-47,1560-64,1904-10. 
After the close of the evidence and prior to instructing the jury, the trial court erroneously 
dismissed plaintiffs claim for promissory estoppel sua sponte and refused to instruct the jury on 
UTCO's promissory estoppel. The Court stated: 
I've indicated in chambers that I was not instructing on the equitable causes 
of action of promisory [sic] estoppel. For the record, the reasons I have determined 
not to do that is, I am satisfied the plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law and, I 
believe, it is the rule that equitable remedy is not available as long as there is an 
adequate remedy at law. And I believe there is here. 
Also, I am satisfied that the concept of promissory estoppel basically mirrors 
the causes of action that are being asserted in this case by the plaintiff. And they'll 
just be surplasage. 
Finally, I'm satisfied that the court of appeals case that was cited to me by 
plaintiffs counsel, saying that they seem to suggest that the court must send equitable 
causes of action to the jury is factually distinguishable in this case and I'm satisfied it 
would be inappropriate to submit that equitable claim to a jury, if it was otherwise 
proper. R.2606-07. 
Later, plaintiff objected to the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury regarding the plaintiffs 
promissory estoppel claim: 
Mr. Gibb: In light of the court's ruling, I don't believe I need to address our 
exception to Number 18, which was entitled "Promissory Estoppel". The Court has 
addressed that fully in its ruling and your record, I believe, previously, with respect to that 
issue. 
The Court: Just as long as the record shows that any offered exceptions, or any 
offered instructions that you submitted in this matter have not been given because of that 
ruling and that you have an exception to those. 
Mr. Gibb: Correct, your Honor. We believe that Instruction Number 18 on 
promisory [sic] estoppel did adequately state the law. R.2611. 
The trial court also refused to instruct the jury on plaintiffs proposed jury instructions 
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regarding the defendants' changing of identifying serial numbers on the Houseboat, and damages for 
loss use of property. R. 2610-11. This loss of use of the property was for consequential damages 
suffered by UTCO as a result of the loss of the money sent to Sumerset and Sharpe. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
After more than three years of litigation and on the last day of a five-day jury trial, the trial 
court for the first time informed UTCO that it was refusing to instruct the jury on UTCO's 
promissory estoppel claim. The trial court cited procedural arguments as a basis for its decision 
despite the fact that the parties had consented to have the issued tried by the jury. The trial court's 
sua sponte refusal to instruct the jury on the issue of promissory estoppel is contrary to Utah law 
allowing such claims to be tried to a jury where the parties consent thereto. The promissory estoppel 
claim was not surplusage as the trial court held. Accordingly, UTCO is entitled to a new trial on its 
claim for promissory estoppel. 
The trial court also improperly prohibited UTCO from presenting evidence that Sumerset and 
Sharpe had changed the serial numbers on the Houseboat they promised to send to UTCO and further 
precluded UTCO from introducing evidence that a boat with different dimensions but bearing the 
same serial number as was sent to UTCO was sold by Sumerset and Sharpe. Under Utah law, 
fraudulent intent is determined by weighing all surrounding circumstances including those which 
occur after the fraudulent representation is made because the law recognizes that there is rarely direct 
evidence of fraud. The trial court erred in excluding evidence described in Sharpe and Sumerset's 
motion in limine including the changed serial numbers and the subsequent sale to a third person. 
UTCO is entitled to a new trial on its fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims. 
- 1 0 -
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SUA SPONTE DISMISSED 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL. 
On July 30, 1996, after the close of the evidence and just prior to instructing the jury, the trial 
court announced that it was dismissing sua sponte plaintiffs claim for promissory estoppel. The trial 
court stated: 
I am satisfied the plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law and . . .that the concept 
of promissory estoppel basically mirrors the causes of action that are being asserted in this 
case by the plaintiff. And they'll just be surplasage. 
Finally,. . .I'm satisfied it would be inappropriate to submit that equitable claim to a 
jury, if it was otherwise proper. 
R.2606-07. The trial court did not state whether the sua sponte refusal to instruct the jury on 
UTCO's promissory estoppel claim was under Rule 12 or Rule 41, or whether it was a directed 
verdict. However, the trial court's failure to cite its basis for refusing to instruct the jury on UTCO's 
promissory estoppel claim is of no moment as this Court pays no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions decided under any of these rules. This Court reviews for correctness the trial court's 
refusal to instruct the jury regarding plaintiffs promissory estoppel claim. Cornia v. Wilcox. 898 
P.2d 1379, 1386 (Utah 1995). 
A, THE PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
PRESENTED TO THE JURY. 
Although promissory estoppel is an equitable claim for relief which is normally tried 
- 1 1 -
to the bench,6 the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allow the jury to act as a factfinder in an equity 
action: "In all actions not triable of right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own initiative may 
try any issue with an advisory jury or, with the consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury 
whose verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right."7 The parties had both 
agreed that the promissory estoppel claim should be submitted to the jury. Both parties had prepared 
jury instructions on that claim The parties knew and agreed to present their case to the jury as 
evidenced by Defendants demand for a jury trial regarding all issues8 and the lack of objection from 
either party to the trial court's scheduling order and the pretrial order which ordered that the entire 
case be for a jury trial.9 In spite of that consent to submit the issue to the jury, the trial court sua 
6See Tolhoe Constr. v. Stoker Pming & Constr.. 682 P.2d 843. 849 (Utah 1984). 
7Rule 39(c). Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Goldberg, 896 P.2d at 1242 (Citing Nicholson v. Evans, 642 
P 2d 727. 728 (Utah 1982); Romre/lv. lions First Nat'l Bonk, 611 P.2d 392. 394 (Utah 1980); WiUardM. Milne 
Inv. Co. v. Car, 580 P.2d 607. 609 (Utah 1978); Andreoson v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171. 174 
(Utah App. 1993); see also 5 James W. Moore et al.. Moore's Federal Practice U 39.04 (1994) (stating verdict has 
effect of common law verdict, although action formerly would have been in equity)). 
8Recordat583. 606. 
9Although a jury trial on all issues was not formally stipulated to. it is clear on a review of the record and the 
Court's scheduling and pretrial orders that all parties thought all issues were being tried to a jury. Record at 
583.606.1431.1692. Further under Utah law, "[e]\press consent is unnecessary." Goldberg v. Jay Timmons & 
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spoiite found that it would be "inappropriate to submit that equitable claim to a jury." R.2607. This 
was error. The trial court's refusal to instruct was not based on the merits of the claim, but on 
procedural grounds. The trial court gave three procedural reasons for its refusal to instruct. It did 
not assess or weigh the evidence submitted by UTCO in support of its promissory estoppel claim. 
The Court found that plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law, the promissory estoppel claim was 
"surplusage" and that it would be inappropriate to send an equitable claim to the jury for adjudication. 
R.2606-07. 
The trial court committed prejudicial error when it failed to instruct the jury on UTCO's 
promissory estoppel claim. The trial court further compounded that error when it failed to notify the 
parties until the close of the evidence that the jury would not be consulted and that it would refuse 
to instruct the jury regarding UTCO's promissory estoppel. In Goldberg v. Jay Timmons & 
Associates. 896 P.2d 1241, 1243-44 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), this Court stated: 
Associates,S96 P.2d 1241. n. 3 (Utah Ct. App. \995){citing Bereda v. Pickering Creek Indus. Park, Inc., 865 F.2d 
49. 52 (3d Cir. 1989). The Goldberg court further concluded: 
Giving the jury's verdict full significance in Nicholson, the court found persuasive that 
plaintiffs demanded a jury trial with defendants' apparent acquiescence, and the 
proceedings went forward as if the entire case were being tried by jury as a matter of 
right. Consequently, it is appropriate for this Court to review the decisions of the judge 
and jury on that same basis. 
Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P. 2d 727, 728; see also Thompson v. Parkes, 963 F.2d885. 888 (6th 
Cir. 1992) (holding parties consented to jury trial of equitable issues under Federal Rule 39(c) because "the parties 
agreed and the court ordered on several occasions that the matter be tried as a jury case1'); Bereda v. Pickering 
Creek Indus. Park, Inc., 865 F.2d 49. 52 (3d Cir. 1989). ("Since [both parties] requested a jury trial and the subject 
of an advisory jury was never mentioned at any time during the proceedings, [the parties] must be deemed to have 
consented to a trial by a nonadvisory jury under Rule 39(c)."). 
Those same points are persuasive in this action. Record at 583. 606. 1431. 1692. 
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Federal courts have addressed the issue of when a court must notify parties that a 
jury's verdict will be advisory and nonbinding in cases in which the parties have 
otherwise consented to a binding jury trial. See Thompson. 963 F.2d at 888-90; 
Bereda, 865 F.2d at 52-53. Those courts conclude that "considerations of fairness 
to the litigants indicate that Rule 39(c) should not be interpreted to allow a district 
judge to rule a jury verdict advisory after the parties have begun to implement their 
trial plan."10 
We agree with the federal courts' interpretation of Rule 39(c) and hold ithe 
trial court had intended "of its own initiative," Utah R.Civ.P. 39(c), to use an advisory 
jury, it should have notified the parties before the trial began. See Winegar v. Slim 
Olson. Inc.. 122 Utah 487, 252 P.2d 205, 207 (1953) (holding because Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure were fashioned after federal rules, we may examine decisions under 
federal rules to determine meaning of Utah rules) 
B. DAMAGES ARE THE REMEDY FOR PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL 
CLAIMS. 
A cause of action for promissory estoppel requires the equitable enforcement of a promise and 
the award of damages, a legal remedy, for breach of that promise. In Topik v. Thurber. 739 P.2d 
l0Citing Bereda, 865 F.2d at 53; Charles Jacquin Et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc., 730 F.Supp. 662. 
664 (E.D.Pa. 1990): see also Thompson, 963 F.2d at 889 ("The parties are entitled to know prior to trial whether 
the jury or the court will be the trier of fact."); A KM Corp. v. Corporate Aircraft Management, 626 F.Supp. 
1533. 1551 (D.Mass. 1985) ("It strikes the [c]ourt as unfair and inequitable to permit a party to wait and see what 
the jury's verdict will be before making application to the [c]ourt to employ a rule 39(c) advisory jury."); 
Hildebrandv. Board of Trustees, 607 F.2d 705. 710 (6th Cir.1979) ("To convert a trial from a jury trial to a bench 
trial... in the middle of the proceedings is to interfere with counsel's presentation of their case and. quite possibly, 
to prejudice one side or the other."); 5 Moore et al.. supra, H 39.10[1] ("[T]he court should give advance notice to 
the parties when it plans to use an advisory jury."). But see MerexA.G. v. Kairchild Weston Sys., Inc., 29 F.3d 
821. 823. 827 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 39(c) "by waiting until 
mid-way through trial before telling the parties that the verdict would not be binding." but stating advance notice is 
"preferable")**). 
The Goldberg court further observed: 
"First." '[a]ny good trial lawyer will testify that there are significant tactical differences in presenting and arguing 
a case to a jury as opposed to a judge.'" Bereda, 865 F.2d at 53 (quoting Hildebrand, 607 F.2d at 710). Second. 
the parties "will have been able to conduct voir dire with the knowledge of the role the jury will play in the case." 
Bereda, 865 F.2d at 53. And finally. "[a]ll jury verdicts in cases not triable by right by a jury would effectively be 
advisory, as the [trial] judge could always rule that the verdict was advisory- if the judge did not agree with the 
jury's verdict." Id. at 52.** 896 P.2d at 1243. 
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1101 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court stated, "The doctrine of promissory estoppel has 
application when a promise is made which can reasonably be expected to induce action or forbearance 
and which in fact induces action or forbearance from which a detriment is suffered." Utah courts 
have traditionally allowed a flexible approach in granting remedies for breach of a promise which is 
enforced pursuant to promissory estoppel. In Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co.. 848 P.2d 171, 
176 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), this Court stated, "While the damages must be limited to those incurred 
through reasonable reliance, the flexible and equitable nature of promissory estoppel allows for 
damages even where the plaintiff receives a benefit such as improved health, a repaired car, or a 
repaired home." In Ouagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders. Inc.. 538 P.2d 301 (Utah 1975), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the promissor's failure to perform in accordance with what it had promised 
under the terms of the contract constituted a breach "which entitled plaintiffs to compensation for the 
injury caused thereby." Li at 310. 
While the enforcement of the promise is equitable in nature, remedies under a promissory 
estoppel claim are legal and require the awarding of damages for breach of a promise. Because both 
legal and equitable claims were alleged by UTCO, the equitable claims should have been submitted 
to the jury as well. In Zions First Nafl Bank v. Rocky Mtn. Irr. Inc.. 795 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1990), 
the Court stated: 
In the federal courts, there is no question that when legal and equitable issues turn on 
the same operative facts, a jury must decide the legal issue first; the jury's factual 
determination binds the trial court in its determination of the parallel equitable issue. 
We approve of this procedure. 
The trial court should not have reserved the issue of fraudulent alteration to 
itself The court compounded its error by directing a verdict on the issue as it related 
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to the RICE counterclaim. There is abundant evidence in the record to support a 
finding of material, fraudulent alteration, especially when viewed in the light most 
favorable to Rocky Mountain. 
Id. (Citations omitted). The trial court should have instructed the jury on promissory estoppel. That 
error was compounded because the jury had properly heard the evidence supporting promissory 
estoppel claim and "damage assessment is peculiarly a jury function."11 The trial court should have 
allowed plaintiffs promissory estoppel claim to be decided by the jury. 
C BECAUSE THE JURY DID NOT FIND A CONTRACT EXISTED 
UTCO DID NOT HAVE AN ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW" AND 
THE PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIM WAS NOT 
"SURPLUSAGE." 
The trial court erroneously held: "plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law and, I believe, it 
is the rule that equitable remedy is not available as long as there is an adequate remedy at law. And 
I believe there is here." R.2606. Though it is true that where there is an adequate remedy at law, no 
equitable remedy will be implied,12 the trial court mistakenly concluded that the jury would find that 
there was an express contract between the parties. However, the promissory estoppel claim was not 
redundant because the jury found that there was no breach of contract, and, in fact, no contract 
between UTCO and Sharpe. The jury found that UTCO was not entitled to recover on its breach of 
contract claim against Sharpe. R.1672 (Special Interrogatory No. 7). Next to the special 
nBattyv. Mitchell 575 P.2d 1040. 1043 (Utah 1978). 
"See American Towers Owners' Association, Inc. v. CCIMechanical, Inc.. 930 P.2d 1182. 1193 (Utah 
1996)(" [I]f a legal remedy is available, such as breach of an express contract, the law will not imply the equitable 
remedy of unjust enrichment." Citing Mann v. American Western Life Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461. 465 (Utah 1978) 
("Recovery in quasi contract is not available where there is an express contract covering the subject matter of the 
litigation."); Dories v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264. 268 (Utah.Ct.App.1987) ("Recovery under quantum meruit 
presupposes that no enforceable written or oral contract exists."). 
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interrogatory on the verdict form, the jury wrote: "No contract UTCO/Sharpe." R. 1672. Because 
the jury found that there was no breach of contract, UTCO did not have an adequate remedy at law.13 
The jury should have been allowed to make factual findings regarding UTCO's promissory estoppel 
claim as a separate and independent claim. 
The question should have been submitted to the jury, to which Sharpe had no objection, and 
because the operative facts support legal and equitable causes of action. In this case, the jury did not 
receive the opportunity to adjudicate the facts as the parties consented and to find, as an alternative 
to the breach of contract claim, that Sharpe was liable on a theory of promissory estoppel. See 
Billings v. Union Bankers' Ins. Co.. 918 P.2d 461, 467(Utah 1996)(jury may properly consider 
alternate theories on same set of facts). The trial court simply erred when it refused to instruct the 
jury on UTCO's promissory estoppel claim. 
The trial court's basis for its refusal to instruct on that claim should not withstand the scrutiny 
of this Court. The trial court held that the promissory estoppel claim was "surplusage." Black's Law 
Dictionary defines "surplasage" as "extraneous, impertinent, superfluous, or unnecessary matter." 
Black's Law Dictionary, 572 (5th ed. 1983).14 This Court should hold that UTCO's promissory 
estoppel claim was an independent and separate claim from all of UTCO's other claims and that it 
was not "surplusage." 
While the operative facts may be similar, the elements of a claim for fraud or negligent 
13Record at 1671-72. 
14Addendum E. 
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misrepresentation and the elements of a claim for promissory estoppel are different and are not 
redundant. Indeed, the burden of proof for fraud is clear and convincing evidence while the burden 
of proof for promissory estoppel is a preponderance of the evidence. The differing burdens of proof 
provide a further distinction between the misrepresentation claims and the promissory estoppel claims. 
The trial court erred in its conclusion that an adequate remedy at law existed and that the promissory 
estoppel claim was "surplusage." The court should have allowed the jury to make findings with 
respect to the promissory estoppel claim. 
D. UTCO PRESENTED ADEQUATE EVIDENCE TO HAVE THE JURY 
DECIDE PLAINTIFF'S PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIM. 
The trial court did not make any determination as to the merits of UTCO's promissory 
estoppel claim. Its refusal to instruct the jury was based solely on procedural grounds. The court 
did not, for example, direct a verdict against UTCO based on insufficiency of the evidence presented. 
Even so, ample evidence was introduced at trial to support the promissory estoppel claim. UTCO 
introduced evidence that Sharpe promised to send a boat upon receipt of money from UTCO and that 
Sharpe reasonably expected the promise to induce action or forbearance. See Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts, Section 90 (1979). The evidence showed that the promise did in fact induce action or 
forbearance by UTCO from which a detriment was suffered. UTCO presented evidence that Sharpe 
had promised that he would ship the Houseboat to Utah upon receipt of moneys from UTCO's 
attorney, Mr. Bruce J. Nelson.75 Indeed, Sharpe admitted that his promise induced UTCO to send 
15Record at 2198-99. 
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funds on or about December 29, 1992 to Sumerset.16 Thereafter, Sharpe and Sumerset allege in their 
Amended Answer, that the "sale of the Houseboat to Zimmerman was terminated by Zimmerman and 
at the request of Zimmerman, the funds that had been paid toward purchase of this houseboat were 
credited to other accounts of Zimmerman with Sumerset." R.642-43. They also admit that "the 
serial number shown on the MSO sent to Nelson was assigned to a different houseboat than the 
houseboat which Zimmerman had agreed to purchase" and "that Sumerset sold a houseboat to a John 
Runda which bears the same serial number as the MSO sent to Nelson". R.642-43. 
Sharpe testified that he had a "little trail going" or "course of dealing" with UTCO whereby 
UTCO would send money to obtain an interest in a boat which had been or would be shipped by 
defendants to Utah. R2092-93. Sharpe further admitted that he never told Nelson that he was going 
to apply the payment of $58,384 to the amount Zimmerman owed Sharpe on another boat. R. 2077. 
Sharpe also testified that when he was sending MSOs to Nelson he understood that Nelson "would 
be using that as collateral on the boat" and that the MSO was required to license the boat in another 
state. R.2095. Finally, Sharpe admitted that the boat described in the MSO and other documents 
sent to Nelson "was never manufactured by Sumerset." R.2097-98. 
Sharpe testified under cross-examination that he had admitted in his answers to interrogatories 
that the $58,384 was applied the same day it was received to the other boat. R.2148-50. Nelson 
testified that he called Sharpe on numerous occasions and verified that if UTCO sent $58,384.00, 
Sharpe would send a boat described in the MSO and other documents that Sharpe had previously sent 
'Record at 2060-61. 2092-93. 
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to Nelson R 2196-99 Upon receiving Mr Sharpe's assurances that a boat would be sent upon 
receipt of the $58,384, Mr Nelson sent the money to Sumerset R 2199-2202 Nelson testified that 
he found out that the boat bearing the serial number on the MSO sent to Nelson had been sold to 
another person R 2210-11 Although defendants later objected to this line of questioning, they did 
not move to strike Mr Nelson's testimony that a boat bearing the serial number sent to Nelson was 
sold to a third party Accordingly, the trial court should have allowed plaintiff to put on evidence and 
should have instructed the jury regarding the changing of identification numbers described in 
defendants' motion in limine 17 
In sum, UTCO presented adequate evidence in support of its promissory estoppel claim The 
evidence supported each element of the promissory estoppel claim as shown above The jury could 
have reasonably found for UTCO on its promissory estoppel claim based on that evidence UTCO 
is prejudiced because the trial court refused to instruct or otherwise adjudicate UTCO's promissory 
estoppel claim and UTCO is therefore entitled to a new trial on its claim for promissory estoppel 
The judgment should be reversed 
1
 'See lions First Nat 7 Bank v Rockv Mtn Irr Inc . 795 P 2d 658. 663-64 (Utah 1990)COur rules of ci\ ll 
procedure require that the pleadings be conformed to the evidence presented at trial when no objection is made to 
the introduction of such eudence Utah R Ci\ P 15(b). see Paulsen v Paulsen. 672 P 2d 97 (Utah 1983) 
(mandator} for trial court to grant k r^se to amend to conform to evidence). General Ins Co v Carmcero Dvnastv 
Corp . 545 P 2d 502. 505-06 (Utah 1976) (failure to object to eudence outside scope of pleadings is implied 
consent to try issue raised b> such e\ idence) The trial court has no discretion to deny such an amendment 
General Ins Co . 545 P 2d at 506 B\ not giving the proposed instructions on common law fraud and attempted 
theft hv deception, the trial court failed to comply \\ ith rule 15(h) Furthermore, our case law requires that the trial 
court instruct the jur> on each partys theon of the case so long as it is supported b\ competent eudence See, e g. 
Powers v Gene's Bldg Materials, Inc . 567 P 2d 174. 176 (Utah 1977). Pacific ChromaloxDiv v Irew 787 P 2d 
1319. 1328 (Utah Ct App 1990) ")(Emphasis added) 
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1L THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE THAT SHARPE 
CHANGED THE SERIAL NUMBERS ON BOATS AND SOLD THE BOAT 
TO ANOTHER PARTY.18 
On July 11, 1993, defendants filed their first "combined" motion in limine to preclude UTCO 
from presenting evidence regarding defendants' alteration of serial numbers and subsequent sale of 
the Houseboat with the serial number that was on the MSO sent to UTCO. R. 1486-90. Thereafter, 
on the opening day of trial, defendants filed two more "combined" motions in limine to preclude the 
testimony of witnesses and presentation of other evidence regarding that same issue. R.1541-
47,1560-64. The trial court discussed the matter at length in with the parties' counsel in chambers 
and off the record. Upon return to the courtroom, defendants' counsel indicated that he had nothing 
further to say on the record which had not been previously covered in chambers. R. 1904. The trial 
court then asked UTCO's counsel several questions and UTCO's counsel indicated that cases cited 
to the trial court "indicate very clearly that subsequent events can help to establish the fraudulent 
intention of the defendant at the time that the act occurs. . . .1 think the fact finder should be looking 
to all of the facts and circumstances in order to fairly evaluate and understand." R. 1908. The Court 
stated: 
I'm going to grant the motion. I can't see any relevance to the proposition 
that the, at least based on what I've heard so far, that the reassignment of a serial 
number to another boat, to a third person who is not claiming to be involved in this 
situation, has any relevance to the state of mind of the defendant for purposes of 
committing fraud at the time these representations were made. I recognize after 
events may have some probative value, but in this case I can't see what it might be. 
The Court should note as stated above, the subsequent sale of the Houseboat to another party was presented to 
the jury. See supra n. 20 and accompanying text. 
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The fact that the boat with a serial number did not exist, and was never built 
to the specifications in the original invoice, is all the plaintiff needs in that regard. The 
rest of it is surplusage and a waste of time. Unless the evidence changes, it's not 
coming in. The Motion is granted. 
That doesn't mean you can't put in evidence that there never was a boat with 
that serial number, or that was the serial number on the invoices and there is no such 
boat, but its' not, I don't see any relevance to the fact that serial number now appears 
on some other boat. The motion is granted. R. 1910. 
The trial court erroneously precluded the presentation of this evidence because it deemed it was not 
relevant and because it was "surplusage." As shown below, the exclusion of that evidence was 
prejudicial to UTCO as it would have assisted the jury in determining the intent of defendants at the 
time they made representations to UTCO that a boat would be shipped to Utah if UTCO sent money 
to defendants. UTCO is therefore entitled to a new trial on its claims for fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation. 
Direct evidence of fraudulent intent is seldom, if ever, present. Thus, fraudulent intent must 
usually be proven by evidence regarding all the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction 
at issue. Indeed, as noted by this Court, f,[a] Court may look to all of the surrounding facts and 
circumstances and a continuing pattern of wrongful behavior is one indicator of fraudulent intent." 
Harline v. Barker. 854 P.2d 595, 601 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)(emphasis added)(internal quotation and 
citation omitted); See also Bails v. Car. 558 P.2d 458 (Mont. 1976) (holding that fraudulent intent 
must be determined in light of all surrounding circumstances); Ledbetter v. Webb. 711 P.2d 874 
(N.M. 1985) (holding that facts and circumstances surrounding a transaction may provide clear and 
convincing evidence of fraudulent intent). In Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assoc. 910 P.2d 1252, 1262 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996), this Court stated, "The existence of fraudulent intent is a factual question, 
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which may be inferred from all of the attendant circumstances. It necessarily involves weighing the 
evidence presented and assessing the credibility of witnesses-tasks largely within the province of the 
fact-finder.19 
In this case, the reassignment by Sharpe and Sumerset of the serial number for the Houseboat 
shown on the MSO they sent to Nelson to a second, different, houseboat manufactured by Sharpe 
and Sumerset and the subsequent sale of the second houseboat are some of the facts and 
circumstances that the jury should have been allowed to examine to determine whether Sharpe and 
Sumerset possessed the requisite fraudulent intent. Indeed, evidence that Sharpe and Sumerset 
reassigned the serial number only three or four months after they attempted to void the sale of the 
Houseboat to Zimmerman without giving notice to UTCO is proof that Sharpe and Sumerset never 
intended to consummate their transaction with Zimmerman and UTCO. That evidence was clearly 
relevant to UTCO's fraud claim. 
Sharpe and Sumerset argued at trial that the evidence in question was not relevant because 
the assignment of the serial number to a different boat and the sale of that boat occurred several 
months after the transaction with UTCO. As UTCO argued to the trial court, however, subsequent 
conduct supports an inference of prior intent not to fulfill a promise or representation. See, e.g.. 
Miller v. National Am. Life Ins. Co.. 54 Cal. App. 3d 331, 126 Cal. Rptr. 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). 
Indeed, as noted by one Court, "[s]ince fraud is usually denied, it must be inferred from all facts and 
circumstances . . . including subsequent conduct." Garden State Standardbred Sales Co. Inc. v. 
l9CitingIn re Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343. 1349 (Utah 1994); State v. Delaney 869 P.2d 4. 6 (Utah App. 1994); 
State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037. 1040 n. 4 (Utah App. 1993). affd 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995); State v. Garrett, 
849 P.2d 578. 582 (Utah App.). cert denied 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
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Seese, 611 A.2d 1239, 1243 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (emphasis added). 
In sum, evidence that Sharpe and Sumerset reassigned the serial number for the Houseboat 
shown on the MSO they sent to Nelson to a different houseboat and then subsequently sold the 
second houseboat is relevant to UTCO's fraud claim, specifically on the issue of fraudulent intent. 
The fact that this conduct occurred three or four months after Sharpe and Sumerset attempted to void 
their transaction with Zimmerman and UTCO does not in any way diminish the relevance of that 
evidence. The trial court erroneously granted defendants' motion in limine and UTCO is entitled to 
a new trial on its claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court improperly dismissed plaintiffs claim for promissory estoppel and erroneously 
excluded evidence regarding reassignment of serial number for the houseboat. Plaintiff prays that the 
judgment of the trial court be vacated and that this action be remanded for a new trial on plaintiffs 
causes of action for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, punitive damages, and 
breach of contract. 
DATED this 23rd day of October, 1997. 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR 
/Jeffrey M. Jones 
i J/Mark Gibb 
^Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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RCP Rule 12, RULE 12. DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS Pagel 
*25 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12 
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 
PART IIL PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, 
AND ORDERS 
Current with amendments received through 
10-15-96. 
RULE 12. DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS 
(a) When Presented. A defendant shall serve his 
answer within twenty days after the service of the 
summons and complaint is complete unless 
otherwise expressly provided by statute or order 
of the court. A party served with a pleading 
stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an 
answer thereto within twenty days after the service 
upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his reply to a 
counterclaim in the answer within twenty days 
after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered 
by the court, within twenty days after service of 
the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The 
service of a motion under this rule alters these 
periods of time as follows, unless a different time 
is fixed by order of the court: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones 
its disposition until the trial on the merits, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within ten 
days after notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more 
definite statement, the responsive pleading shall 
be served within ten days after the service of the 
more definite statement. 
(b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or 
fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading 
thereto if one is required, except that the following 
defenses may at the option of the pleader be made 
by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the 
subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the 
person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of 
process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. 
A motion making any of these defenses shall be 
made before pleading if a further pleading is 
permitted. No defense or objection is waived by 
being joined with one or more other defenses or 
objections in a responsive pleading or motion or 
by further pleading after the denial of such motion 
or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for 
relief to which the adverse party is not required to 
serve a responsive pleading, he may assert at the 
trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for 
relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense 
numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
matters outside the pleading are presented to and 
not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and 
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties 
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present 
all material made pertinent to such a motion by 
Rule 56. 
*26 (c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. 
After the pleadings are closed but within such 
time as not to delay the trial, any party may move 
for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the 
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the 
court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in 
Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable 
opportunity to present all material made pertinent 
to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary Hearings. The defenses 
specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in subdivision (b) 
of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by 
motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned in 
subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and 
determined before trial on application of any 
party, unless the court orders that the hearings and 
determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for More Definite Statement. If a 
pleading to which a responsive pleading is 
permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party 
cannot reasonably be required to frame a 
responsive pleading, he may move for a more 
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definite statement before interposing his 
responsive pleading. The motion shall point out 
the defects complained of and the details desired. 
If the motion is granted and the order of the court 
is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the 
order or within such other time as the court may 
fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the 
motion was directed or make such order as it 
deems just. 
(f) Motion to Strike. Upon motion made by a 
party before responding to a pleading or, if no 
responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, 
upon motion made by a party within twenty days 
after the service of the pleading upon him, the 
court may order stricken from any pleading any 
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, 
impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of Defenses. A party who 
makes a motion under this rule may join with it 
the other motions herein provided for and then 
available to him. If a party makes a motion under 
this rule and does not include therein all defenses 
and objections then available to him which this 
rule permits to be raised by motion, he shall not 
thereafter make a motion based on any of the 
defenses or objections so omitted, except as 
provided in subdivision (h) of this rule. 
(h) Waiver of Defenses. A party waives all 
defenses and objections which he does not present 
either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he 
has made no motion, in his answer or reply, except 
(1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, the defense of failure 
to join an indispensable party, and the objection of 
failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also 
be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or 
by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the 
trial on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it 
appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise 
that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject 
matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The 
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be 
disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light 
of any evidence that may have been received. 
*27 (i) Pleading After Denial of a Motion.- The 
filing of a responsive pleading after the denial of 
any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not 
be deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for Costs of a Nonresident Plaintiff. 
When the plaintiff in an action resides out of this 
state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant 
may file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish 
security for costs and charges which may be 
awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and 
determination by the court of the reasonable 
necessity therefor, the court shall order the 
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with 
sufficient sureties as security for payment of such 
costs and charges as may be awarded against such 
plaintiff. No security shall be required of any 
officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United 
States. 
(k) Effect of Failure to File Undertaking. If the 
plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as ordered 
within 30 days of the service of the order, the 
court shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an 
order dismissing the action. 
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WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 
PART VI. TRIALS 
Current with amendments received through 
10-15-96. 
RULE 41. DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS 
(a) Voluntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof. 
(1) By Plaintiff; By Stipulation. Subject to the 
provisions of Rule 23(c), of Rule 66, and of any 
applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by 
the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a 
notice of dismissal at any time before service by 
the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for 
summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a stipulation 
of dismissal signed by all parties who have 
appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in 
the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal 
is without prejudice, except that a notice of 
dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the 
merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once 
dismissed in any court of the United States or of 
any state an action based on or including the same 
claim. 
(2) By Order of Court. Except as provided in 
Paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an 
action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs 
instance save upon order of the court and upon 
such terms and conditions as the court deems 
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a 
defendant prior to the service upon him of the 
plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not 
be dismissed against the defendant's objection 
unless the counterclaim can remain pending for 
independent adjudication by the court. Unless 
otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under 
this paragraph is without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof. For 
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply 
with these rules or any order of court, a defendant 
may move for dismissal of an action or of any 
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claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action 
tried by the court without a jury, has completed 
the presentation of his evidence the defendant, 
without waiving his right to offer evidence in the 
event the motion is not granted, may move for a 
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and 
the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. 
The court as trier of the facts may then determine 
them and render judgment against the plaintiff or 
may decline to render any judgment until the close 
of all the evidence. If the court renders judgment 
on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall 
make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless 
the court in its order for dismissal otherwise 
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and 
any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other 
than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for 
improper venue or for lack of an indispensable 
party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
*85 (c) Dismissal of Counterclaim, Cross-
Claim, or Third-Party Claim. The provisions of 
this rule apply to the dismissal of any 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. A 
voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone 
pursuant to Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of 
this rule shall be made before a responsive 
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the 
introduction of evidence at the trial or hearing. 
(d) Costs of Previously-Dismissed Action. If a 
plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in any 
court commences an action based upon or 
including the same claim against the same 
defendant, the court may make such order for the 
payment of costs of the action previously 
dismissed as it may deem proper and may stay the 
proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has 
complied with the order. 
(e) Bond or Undertaking to Be Delivered to 
Adverse Party. Should a party dismiss his 
complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-
party claim, pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) 
above, after a provisional remedy has been 
allowed such party, the bond or undertaking filed 
in support of such provisional remedy must 
thereupon be delivered by the court to the adverse 
party against whom such provisional remedy was 
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obtained. 
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WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND 
ITS LIMITS 
Current with amendments received through 
10-15-96. 
RULE 401. DEFINITION OF "RELEVANT 
EVIDENCE" 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is 
of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence. 
Advisory Committee Note 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is 
comparable in substance to Rule 1(2), Utah Rules 
of Evidence (1971), but the former rule defined 
relevant evidence as that haviiig a tendency to 
prove or disprove the existence of any "material 
fact." Avoiding the use of the term "material fact" 
accords with the application given to former Rule 
1(2) by the Utah Supreme Court. State v. 
Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977). 
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WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND 
ITS LIMITS 
Current with amendments received through 
10-15-96. 
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT 
EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE, 
CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations 
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is 
substantively comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules 
of Evidence (1971) except that "surprise" is not 
included as a basis for exclusion of relevant 
evidence. The change in language is not one of 
substance, since "surprise" would be within the 
concept of "unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 
402 [Rule 403]. See also Advisory Committee 
Note to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a 
continuance in most instances would be a more 
appropriate method of dealing with "surprise." 
See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F.Supp. 647 
(N.D.Tex. 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric 
testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and 
violation of due process). See the following Utah 
cases to the same effect. Terry v. Zions Coop. 
Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979); State 
v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1980); Reiser v. 
Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982). 
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SURPLUS 7521 
stock, without deducting debts or liabilities; 
and as the accumulation of moneys or property 
in excess of the par value of the stock. 
As to surplus Earnings; Profit, and Water, 
see those titles. 
Accumulated surplus. That surplus which re-
sults from the accumulation of profits. 
Acquired surplus. Surplus acquired by the 
purchase of one business by another. 
Appreciation surplus. Surplus which results 
from the revaluation of the assets of a business. 
Appropriated surplus. That portion of surplus 
which is earmarked or set aside for a specific 
purpose. 
Capital surplus. All surplus which does not 
arise from the accumulation of profits. It may 
be created by a financial reorganization or by 
gifts to the corporation. The entire surplus of 
a corporation other than its earned surplus. 
Earned surplus. The portion of the surplus of a 
corporation equal to the balance of its net prof-
its, income, gains and losses from the date of 
incorporation, or from the latest date when a 
deficit was eliminated by an application of its 
capital surplus or stated capital or otherwise, 
after deducting subsequent distributions to 
shareholders and transfers to stated capital and 
capital surplus to the extent such distributions 
and transfers are made out of earned surplus. 
Earned surplus shall include also any portion of 
surplus allocated to earned surplus in mergers, 
consolidations or acquisitions of all or substan-
tially all of the outstanding shares or of the 
property and assets of another corporation, do-
mestic or foreign. See also Earned surplus. 
Initial surplus. That surplus which appears on 
the financial statement at the commencement 
of an accounting period and which does not 
reflect the operations for the period covered by 
the statement. 
Operating surplus. That surplus transferred to 
earned surplus at the end of an accounting 
period. 
Paid-in surplus. Surplus paid in by stockhold-
ers as contrasted to earned surplus that arises 
from profits. 
Reserved surplus. See Appropriated surplus, 
above. 
Revaluation surplus. Surplus arising from a 
revaluation of assets above cost, usually in 
connection with a recapitalization (sometimes 
called "recapitalization surplus") or quasi-reor-
ganization (sometimes called "reorganization 
surplus"). 
Unearned surplus. Includes paid-in surplus, re-
valuation surplus, and donated surplus. 
Surplusage. Extraneous, impertinent, superflu-
ous, or unnecessary matter. The remainder or 
surplus of money left. See also Surplus. 
Pleading. Allegations of matter wholly foreign 
and impertinent to the cause. All matter be-
yond the circumstances necessary to constitute] 
the action. Any allegation without which thel 
pleading would yet be adequate. On motion,* 
the court may order stricken from the plead-
ings any insufficient defense, redundant, imma-
terial, or scandalous matter. Fed.R.Civil P. 
12(f)-
Surprise. Act of taking unawares; sudden confu-
sion or perplexity. In its legal acceptation, 
denotes an unforeseen disappointment against 
which ordinary prudence would not have af-
forded protection. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may relieve a party or his legal repre-
sentative from a final judgment, order, or pro-
ceeding because of surprise. Fe&R.Civil P.' 
60(b). 
Ground for new trial. As a ground for a new 
trial, that situation in which a party is unex-
pectedly placed without fault on his part, 
which will work injury to his interests. He 
must show himself to have been diligent at 
every stage of the proceedings, and that the 
event was one which ordinary prudence could 
not have guarded against. A situation or result 
produced, having a substantive basis of fact 
and reason, from which the court may justly 
deduce, as a legal conclusion, that the party 
will surfer a judicial wrong if not relieved from 
his mistake. The general rule is that when a 
party or his counsel is "taken by surprise," in a 
material point or circumstance which could not 
have been anticipated, and when want of skill, 
care, or attention cannot be justly imputed, and 
injustice has been done, a new trial should be 
granted. 
Surrebutter /sarebadar/. In common law plead-
ing, the plaintiffs answer of fact to the defend-
ant's rebutter. It is governed by the same rules 
as the replication. It is no longer required 
under modern pleading. 
Surrejoinder /sarejoyndar/. In common law 
pleading, the plaintiffs answer of fact to the 
defendant's rejoinder. It is governed in every 
respect by the same rules as the replication. 
Surrender. To give back; yield; render up; re-
store; and in law, the giving up of an estate to 
the person who has it in reversion or remain-
der, so as to merge it in the larger estate. A 
yielding up of an estate for life or years to him 
who has an immediate estate in reversion or 
remainder, wherein the estate for life or years 
may drown by mutual agreement between 
them. The giving up of a lease before its expi-
ration. In old English law, yielding up a tenan-
cy in a copyhold estate to the lord of the manor 
for a specified purpose. The giving up by a 
bankrupt of his property to his creditors or 
their assignees; also, his due appearance in the 
bankruptcy court for examination as formerly 
required by the bankruptcy acts. 
Surrender is contractual act and occurs only 
through consent of both parties. Surrender 
differs from "abandonment," as applied to 
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INSTRUCTION NO. X ^ 
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL 
In this action, plaintiff claims that defendant promised to 
deliver the Houseboat in Utah upon receipt of the money sent by 
plaintiff. A promise that one should reasonably expect to induce 
action or forbearance on the part of another person, and which does 
reasonably induce such action or forbearance, is binding if 
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. If 
you find that plaintiff has proven the foregoing elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence, plaintiff is entitled to damages. 
References: 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1979) 
MUJI 26.15 
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THE COURT: I'M GOING TO GRANT THE MOTION. 
I CAN'T SEE ANY RELEVANCE TO THE PROPOSITION THAT THE, 
AT LEAST BASED ON WHAT I'VE HEARD SO FAR, THAT THE 
REASSIGNMENT OF A SERIAL NUMBER TO ANOTHER BOAT, TO A 
THIRD PERSON WHO IS NOT CLAIMING TO BE INVOLVED IN 
THIS SITUATION, HAS ANY RELEVANCE TO THE STATE OF MIND 
OF THE DEFENDANT FOR PURPOSES OF COMMITTING FRAUD AT 
THE TIME THESE REPRESENTATIONS WERE MADE. I RECOGNIZE 
AFTER EVENTS MAY HAVE SOME PROBATIVE VALUE, BUT IN 
THIS CASE I CAN'T SEE WHAT IT MIGHT BE. 
THE FACT THAT THE BOAT WITH A SERIAL NUMBER 
DID NOT EXIST, AND WAS NEVER BUILT TO THE 
SPECIFICATIONS IN THE ORIGINAL INVOICE, IS ALL THE 
PLAINTIFF NEEDS IN THAT REGARD. THE REST OF IT IS 
SURPLUSAGE AND A WASTE OF TIME. UNLESS THE EVIDENCE 
CHANGES, IT'S NOT COMING IN. THE MOTION IS GRANTED. 
THAT DOESN'T MEAN YOU CAN'T PUT IN EVIDENCE 
THAT THERE WAS NEVER A BOAT WITH THAT SERIAL NUMBER, 
OR THAT WAS THE SERIAL NUMBER ON THE INVOICES AND 
THERE IS NO SUCH BOAT, BUT IT'S NOT, I DON'T SEE ANY 
RELEVANCE TO THE FACT THAT SERIAL NUMBER NOW APPEARS 
ON SOME OTHER BOAT. THE MOTION IS GRANTED. 
MR. JONES: YOUR HONOR, I HAD A COUPLE OF 
HOUSEKEEPING MATTERS BEFORE — 
THE COURT: YOU ARE GOING TO HAVE A JURY. 
19 
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SHEET ON THE FRONT OF YOUR INSTRUCTIONS SO I HAVE JUST 
NOTED ON YOUR COVER LETTER THAT EXPLAINS HOW YOU PUT 
THE INSTRUCTIONS TOGETHER THAT THESE ARE YOUR 
ORIGINALS AND NOT — I WILL RULE ON THOSE, AS 
INDICATED. 
MR. HAWKINS: THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: FINALLY, AS I ASK COUNSEL TO 
AGREE UPON INSTRUCTIONS, AT LEAST THE ONES YOU COULD, 
THAT DIDN'T HAVE THE FORMAL COVER SHEET EITHER, IT 
CAME UNDER THE LETTER MR. GIBB AND MR. JONES SIGNED. 
AND I WILL JUST MARK ON THE TOP OF THOSE THAT THEY 
WERE THE STIPULATED INSTRUCTIONS. 
I'LL HAVE THOSE PUT IN THE FILE AS WELL. 
THERE IS A COUPLE OF THINGS I NEED TO SAY, 
FOR THE RECORD, ON INSTRUCTIONS, AND THEN YOU MAY TAKE 
YOUR EXCEPTIONS, GENTLEMEN. 
I'VE INDICATED IN CHAMBERS THAT I WAS NOT 
INSTRUCTING ON THE EQUITABLE CAUSES OF ACTION OF 
PROMISORY ESTOPPEL. FOR THE RECORD, THE REASONS I HAVE 
DETERMINED NOT TO DO THAT IS, I AM SATISFIED THE 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE AN ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW AND, I 
BELIEVE, IT IS THE RULE THAT EQUITABLE REMEDY IS NOT 
AVAILABLE AS LONG AS THERE IS AN ADEQUATE REMEDY AT 
LAW. AND I BELIEVE THERE IS HERE. 
ALSO, I AM SATISFIED THAT THE CONCEPT OF 
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PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL BASICALLY MIRRORS THE CAUSES OF 
ACTION THAT ARE BEING ASSERTED IN THIS CASE BY THE 
PLAINTIFF. AND THEY'LL JUST BE SURPLUSAGE. 
FINALLY, I'M SATISFIED THAT THE COURT OF 
APPEALS CASE THAT WAS CITED TO ME BY PLAINTIFF'S 
COUNSEL, SAYING THAT THEY SEEM TO SUGGEST THAT THE 
COURT MUST SEND EQUITABLE CAUSES OF ACTION TO THE 
JURY, IS FACTUALLY DISTINGUISHABLE IN THIS CASE AND 
I'M SATISFIED IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO SUBMIT THAT 
EQUITABLE CLAIM TO A JURY, IF IT WAS OTHERWISE PROPER. 
I'VE ALSO ADVISED YOU I AM NOT SENDING THE 
QUESTION OF ATTORNEYS FEES TO THE JURY. AND I'LL 
INSTRUCT THE JURY, AND I ASSUME YOU'LL TAKE AN 
APPROPRIATE EXCEPTION, THAT THEY ARE NOT TO CONSIDER 
THE EVIDENCE OF ATTORNEYS FEES IN CONNECTION WITH 
DAMAGES IN THIS CASE. 
I AM SATISFIED THAT NEITHER APPELLATE COURT 
OF THIS STATE HAS HELD THAT ATTORNEYS FEES CAN BE 
SUBMITTED TO A JURY, ARE OTHERWISE RECOVERABLE IN A 
CASE LIKE THE ONE BEFORE THE COURT, WHERE THERE'S A 
CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT, AND IT WAS BETWEEN 
BUSINESSMEN, BASICALLY DEALING AT ARMS LENGTH. 
I BELIEVE, THAT IF THE GENERAL RULE IS TO BE 
FURTHER EXPANDED, COMMON LAW RULE SAYING THAT YOU 
CAN'T RECOVER ATTORNEYS FEES UNLESS IT IS BROUGHT BY 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTCO ASSOCIATES, LTD., a 
Utah limited partnership, by 
and through its general 
partner ROBERT D. KENT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
K. DeMARR ZIMMERMAN, 
SUMERSET HOUSEBOATS, a 




CASE NO. 930904174 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions from the appropriate 
degree of proof, as set forth in the question. At least six 
members of the jury must find in favor of the answer to each 
question. When the verdict form is completed, the foreperson 
should sign and date the verdict form and advise the bailiff that 
you have reached a verdict and are ready to return to the 
courtroom. 
1. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that UTCO 
Associates, Ltd. is entitled to recover on its claim of fraud 
against defendant James E. Sharpe? 
(B) ANSWER: Yes No \S 
If you answered question number 1 "no11, skip question 
number 2. 
2. What amount of damages were proximately caused by 
defendant Sharpe's fraud? 
$ 
3. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that 
UTCO Associates, Ltd. is entitled to recover on its claim of 
negligent misrepresentation against James E. Sharpe? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
If you answered question number 3 "no", skip to question 
number 6. 
4. Considering all the negligence that caused UTCO's loss, 
what percentage is attributable to: 
A. Plaintiff, UTCO % 
B. Defendant Sharpe % 
C. Defendant DeMarr Zimmerman % 
TOTAL 100 % 
5. What amount of damage was proximately caused by the 
foregoing negligence? 
$ 
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find by clear and convincing evidence that 
~ ~ f- - •-
plaintiff is entitled to recover punitive damages? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
1
, Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that UTCO 
Associates, Mil. is entitled to recover on its claim of breach of 
contract against defendant Sharpe? ^ f\ 0 ^
 fl^\.^£.*V 
ANSWER: Yes No / ^' V T<L 0 / S K *Y f 
If you dFiswPiPil question number / :-ii^ f, answer none of 
the remaining questions and have your foreperson sign and date \ DUJ-
verdict. If you answered "yes" to question number 7, please answer 
questi 01 i number 8. 
8. What amount of damages did the defendant Sharpe's breach 
of contract proximately cause UTCO? 
$ 
Dated this Zkfo day of July, 1996. 
FOREPERSON 
0 016 7 2 
